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RESEARCH BRIEF 
 
Anatomizing Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries 
 
OVERVIEW 
The possibility that violent non-state actors (VNSAs), including terrorists and criminals, might employ chemical or biological (CB) 
weapons has understandably attracted much attention in both policy and government circles. This is primarily a result of 
credible evidence of terrorist interest in these weapons and demonstrated terrorist willingness and capability, albeit thus far via 
conventional means, to inflict mass casualties. Much valuable research has been conducted in the areas of state possession of 
CB weapons, the vulnerability of industrial and commercial facilities to attack or infiltration, the technical capabilities required to 
construct CB weapons and preparations for dealing with the consequences of a large-scale chemical or biological attack. In 




The Anatomizing Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries Project sought to improve understanding of, and more 
effectively identify, perpetrators and potential perpetrators of attacks employing CB agents. The project’s objectives included:  
 
1) identifying indicators of VNSA’s potentially changing CB predilections and capabilities;  
2) improving our understanding of potential non-state attackers by identifying salient characteristics of past CB 
adversaries, including the linkage between their strategic concerns and their targets and tactics; and  
3) embedding these findings into a Bayesian analytical tool that can assist policy makers preparing responses to this 
phenomenon.  
 
The ultimate goal was to enhance the capability of defense practitioners to protect the United States by including more detailed 
specifications of the threat component in risk assessment calculations, in addition to the already well-developed vulnerability 
and consequence elements. Although the project’s focus was on ideologically motivated violence, the research also provided 
some insight into criminal use of CB materials, which can also significantly impact public security. 
 
METHOD 
The project’s parameters required that the research team determine those specific organizations, or perpetrator archetypes, 
most likely to present a significant CB threat to the United States within the next decade. Significant CB threats in the context of 
the project were defined as the use by a non-state actor of any harmful chemical or biological materials, as well as attacks on 
facilities that involve the immediate release of CB materials, where the scale of intended harm was 50 or more casualties. 
 
In order to fulfill the project’s goals, the research team adopted a multi-disciplinary analytical approach featuring a combination 
of qualitative and quantitative approaches: 
 
1. A qualitative analysis based on a combination of: the application of a series of literature- and theory-derived indicators to a 
set of extant VNSAs and examining past CB perpetrators, using data from the Chemical and Biological Non-State 
Adversaries Database (CABNSAD), which was assembled and coded as part of the research effort. 
 
2. A quantitative analysis employing a set of statistical models to identify salient characteristics of past CB adversaries 
particularly with regard to the organizational determinants of their pursuit and effective use of CB weapons. Owing to the 
relative rarity of past CB events, methods used included logistic and rare-event logit regression models and event history 
methods. 
 
3. An analysis using the results of a semi-structured and probabilistic elicitation of leading outside subject matter experts in 
the CB terrorism and related domains. This analysis employed a variety of ranking and other probabilistic risk assessment 
procedures.  
 
The final task of the study was to compare the threat rankings that emerged from each research stream and synthesize them, 
although it was first necessary to establish which of the results should serve as the basis for comparison. For the qualitative 
rankings, the selection was simple – the final results that reflected a qualitative synthesis of the multiple systematic rankings 
and the research team’s input. Of the elicitation results, the final (weighted) scores from the probabilistic elicitation were used, 
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since these reflected the most detailed input from the participants, aggregated and weighted by levels of expertise. For the 
quantitative analysis, the selection process was more difficult. Ideally, one would apply the best fitting model from the 
quantitative analysis to the most recent data to identify those organizations that most closely match the characteristics 
statistically associated with pursuing or using CB weapons. However, the quantitative data needed to accomplish this across all 
known terrorist organizations only existed up until 2007 and the variable values for many active terrorist groups have changed 
considerably since then. Moreover, multiple statistical approaches were utilized and it was not always clear which model(s) were 
superior. A number of heuristics were therefore employed to derive a viable ranking from the statistical results, such as 




It is important, from a methodological standpoint, to understand the advantage of applying three methodologies more or less 
independently to the same problem space. This derives from the position that, especially with respect to prospective analyses 
with high levels of uncertainty, each methodological approach carries both strengths and weaknesses, as shown in the table 
below. Comparing the results of multiple methodological inquiries can thus lend greater credence to findings that are 
concordant across approaches, while singling out areas of divergence for closer examination.  
 
Summary of Analytical Approaches 
Qualitative Analysis Statistical Modeling Elicitation 
Based on review of literature, adversary 
profiles and analyst expertise. 
Based on historical empirical data (BAAD2; 
POICN, etc.). 
Combines the judgment of multiple domain 
experts. 
Strengths 
 Incorporates past, extant and future 
threats. 
 All non-state actors. 






 Not rigorously systematic. 
 Potential for analyst bias. 
 
Strengths 
 Allows for exploring variation in dependent 
variable. 
 Takes into account every actor in dataset 
(including null cases). 
 Statistical tests of significance and 
sensitivity possible. 
 Results / models are reproducible. 
 
Limitations 
 Limited time-scale of data (1998-2007). 
 Only includes terrorist/insurgent 
organizations (no criminal groups; lone 
actors, etc.). 
 Cannot make out-of-sample forecasts (i.e., 
limited to groups in dataset). 
Strengths 
 Specifically oriented towards future 
threats. 
 Heterogeneous expertise (operational; 
technical; policy; futurist). 





 Potential for expert bias 




Comparing results from the research streams made it possible to make some broad observations about the VNSA CB threat to 
the United States in the medium term. First, given that all three analytical streams included particular terrorist organizations, it 
increases the confidence in the results that all three streams generated al-Qaida central and two of its most active affiliates, al-
Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as among the most highly ranked threats.  
Indeed, a consistent finding across the three research streams was that the threat of non-state chemical or biological weapons 
pursuit and use lies heavily with jihadists of all stripes, with 7 out of the top 10 (11 of the top 20) spots in the qualitative 
analysis, 9 out of the top 10 (at least 14 out of the top 201) in the quantitative analysis, and half of the top 10 (and top 20) in 
the elicitation, all occupied by jihadist actors. 
 
Lone Actors 
Aside from the threat posed by jihadist groups, the results also drew attention to lone disgruntled actors (especially insider 
technicians or scientists), as well as apocalyptic millenarian and domestic right-wing groups as potential threats capable of 
causing significant harm with CB agents. Although the results were generally consistent when broken down into separate 
                                                          
1 This is less surprising than it looks when one considers that key organizational attributes that emerged as significant from the statistical modeling are the 
tendency to kill prolifically and maintenance of extensive networks with other violent organizations, two factors that are characteristic of jihadist groups. 
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chemical and biological streams, there were some differences, including a much higher prominence for disgruntled scientists as 
a biological threat.  
 
Criminal Groups and Chemicals 
One of the more surprising results overall was the appearance in the threat rankings of criminal groups as potential chemical 
weapons threats, in the ‘2nd tier’ of both the qualitative and elicitation analyses, since this threat is hardly mentioned, if at all, in 
the literature. Criminal groups were not part of the quantitative dataset and so did not appear in these threat rankings. As an 
aggregated group, criminal actors (often, but not always, acting alone) were found to have caused considerable numbers of CB 
casualties over the course of the period studied. Although most criminal use of chemical agents resulted in small numbers of 
injuries or deaths, this was not always the case. It is noteworthy that where criminals did cause a significant number of 
casualties in a single incident this was often a result of ignorance of, or indifference to, the wider consequences of their planned 
actions directed at particular individuals or organizations.  
 
Behavioral Profiles and Bayesian Net 
 
These findings and products were incorporated and extended in the follow-on phases of the study. The primary output of the 
follow-on activities consisted of drawing on the threat rankings to select a set of perpetrators of interest and then to build on the 
initial theory and empirical data collection to create in-depth behavioral profiles (including likely tactical behaviors) of six 
different perpetrators.  
The six detailed behavioral profiles were prepared to examine the motivations, capabilities, and likely operational choices of 
probable VNSA CB actors. As an example, the profile prepared for al-Qaida Central (the core group headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri 
and based in Pakistan) concluded that if the group were to mount a CB attack it would be more likely to attempt a large scale 
chemical attack requiring complex preparations over a significant period of time rather than a relatively simple small-scale 
chemical attack. A large scale biological attack was assessed to be unlikely. Although it is not certain that the organization 
would privilege producing chemical agents independently over seeking to acquire agents that have been prepared by others 
(such as agents produced and held by the Syrian government) this is the more likely scenario. There is also a possibility that its 
operatives might mount an attack on a facility storing significant quantities of chemicals with the intent of releasing these into 
the environment, but this would not fully conform with the organization’s past methods. It is likely that an attack on the United 
States or its interests employing a CB weapon would be organized as a “martyrdom” operation (i.e., a suicide attack) given that 
this is normally the modus operandi for attacks that are planned and carried out by al-Qaida Central, and especially for its 
terrorist “spectaculars.”  
The second major follow-on was the encapsulation of the insights derived in this study into a Bayesian net that can be 




In addition to the overall analysis, behavioral profiles, and Bayesian net discussed above, the project also generated several 
standalone deliverables with a number of potential uses: 
 
 A concise yet relatively comprehensive review of the literature related to non-state CB perpetrators that can be utilized 
as an introduction to the topic for training analysts  
 The most comprehensive open-source database of CB perpetrators ever compiled (CABNSAD), which can continue to 
be mined for insights by researchers and analysts in a variety of applications, from social network analysis to machine 
learning. 
 A range of quantitative elicitation and statistical data that can be incorporated into various computational risk 
assessment and modeling efforts. 
 Operational products that can be used by intelligence and law enforcement agencies and security practitioners to 
proactively interdict the threat by: 
o Identifying a set of adversary threat rankings for the most likely non-state CB adversaries in the next ten years 
o Providing a list of high-priority intelligence targets among extant threats. 
o Supplying a set of differentially diagnostic indicators that can be applied to emerging actors to identify future 
CB perpetrators, determine the level of CB risk presented by known groups, detect shifts in CB threat potential, 
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This project represents one of the most comprehensive attempts to date to identify and characterize future CB adversaries. 
Overall it is intended to provide policy guidance for the strategic investment by government decision makers of resources to 
counter the threat of non-state CB use over the next ten years by highlighting the most likely threats. In addition, the results of 
this analysis can serve as the baseline for future research and analysis and can be revisited as new actors appear and current 
actors evolve. Therefore, this initial phase of the broader Anatomizing Chemical and Biological Non-state Adversaries study 
serves not only as the first stage in an ongoing research project, but also as a vital first step in the broader research endeavor to 
understand the future chemical and biological threats that the U.S. is likely to face within the near to medium term.  
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